necessarily with that effect. Today the cell phone represents a synthesis of connectedness, efficiency, and freedom, a vision celebrated in film, TV, and advertising (where throwing it away signals a daring but temporary freedom from constraint). Mobile phones have transformed social and personal interactions and speeded up working conditions in many occupations. The miniaturization and digitalization of media have enhanced rapid capital accumulation, transnational expansion, financial speculation, and massive corporate failures. Digital telecommunications have created new sites for information and communication among alternative and dissident groups, while exacerbating privatization in everyday life and politics (Morley, 2000; Myerson, 2001).

Social mobility, geographical mobility, physical mobility, and the mobility of capital, information, and other commodities: each displays conflicting economic and cultural effects. Mobility is widely advocated as a positive attribute in the workforce, but it can diminish the autonomy of the employees, subjecting them to unwanted relocations that can disperse their personal roots. While capital and information are increasingly freed from spatial contexts, many employees remain stuck in poorly paid, hazardous jobs behind assembly lines or screens. The omnipresent mobile telephone allows people to converse from any location. Yet the mobile phone allows governments and corporations to use comprehensive surveillance methods to locate and acquire information about telephone users. In each of these cases the link between mobility and freedom turns back upon its users, or is “reversed,” in Marshall McLuhan’s terminology (McLuhan and McLuhan, 1988), and exacerbates conflicts as well as links between mobility and autonomy. The commercial mainstream encourages us to embrace the increased mobility of data, objects, and people, but we should subject this idea to continuous critical scrutiny.

Jody Berland

See: COMMUNICATION, DISABILITY, MEDIA, SPACE.

Modern

Commonly used to indicate a more or less recent phase of time, modern is also one of the most politically charged keywords circulating across languages in the modern world. Closely associated since the IC18 with the notions of “progress” and “development” attributed to the West, the attribute “modern” describes a wide range of historical phenomena characterized by continuous growth and change: in particular, science, technology, industry, secular government, bureaucracy, social mobility, city life, and an “experimental” or modernist approach in culture and the arts. However, when viewed as a distinctive quality emanating out of “the West,” or claimed as a property of particular social groups, the modern becomes a standard against which other customs or ways of life are judged pre-modern. A modernization project then prescribes a “reform” or a “revolutionary change” in accordance with that standard. So difficult is it now to disentangle the history
of the modern from the global impact of Western European colonialism that many people around the world regard their local word for “modern” as a translation of an “original” European word. In this way, the linguistic and social diversity of the world is often still measured against an imaginary norm of modernity equated with Western European historical experience.

The beginnings of “modern” were unremarkable. Entering English from L modernus in C6, “modern” derives from the L adverb modo meaning “just now.” Raymond Williams (1976) points out that the earliest English uses were close to our casual use of “contemporary” to indicate that something exists at the time of speaking or writing: “our maist gracious quene moderne” (1555) is not necessarily a paragon of fashion but simply the queen of the time, and “thy former as well as modern kindness” (1700) means not that you are progressive in your treatment of others but that you have been kind to me lately as you have been in the past. Meanwhile, “contemporary” meant “co-temporary” or “of the same period,” and indicated things existing together, whether in the present or at periods in the past. In the usage of communities outside Western Europe, many of the terms used today to connote “modern,” such as jindai in literary Chinese, once meant something like the L modo and carried no special reference to “the West” – which did not exist in “pre-modern” times as a globally central model.

In modern English, the chronological sense of a “period” became attached to “modern” through the habit of contrasting ancient with modern times that emerged just before the Renaissance, becoming common from lC16 (“the writings of the auncient and moderne Geographers and Historiographers,” 1585), and in C16 L a “Middle Age” or “medieval period” appeared (media aetas, medium aevum). During the C17 and C18 this periodizing use was sharpened, especially in the study of modern languages, to distinguish a past regarded as finished from a relatively recent time that could begin a good while ago and engulf the present: “another Book overwritten in a small Modern Greek hand, about 150 years ago” (1699); “our English Tongue . . . may be said to equal, if not surpass all other Modern Languages” (1706). As the sense of rivalry in the second example suggests, the consolidation of a comparative attitude within as well as toward the evaluation of historical periods began to endow “the modern” with its modern complications.

One of these is the emergence of a two-sided way of thinking about time. From the C17, “modern” could be used to establish both continuity over an extended present marked off from a long-ago past, and a sharp discontinuity between the present and the past. On the one hand, the expansive sense of a modern age long enough to dwarf the significance of “now” was reinforced through the natural sciences: “if such species be termed modern, in comparison to races which preceded them, their remains, nevertheless, enter into submarine deposits many hundred miles in length” (1830). This temporally capacious “modern” entered the vocabulary of English education, with modern schools from the mC19 offering subjects other than classical L and Gk; in the discipline of history the early modern period in Europe still begins just after medieval times. On the other hand, from the lC16 a more
discriminating use of "modern" began to highlight "the novelty of the present as a break or rupture with the past" (P. Osborne, 1996); "Modern warre, is the new order of warre vsed in our age" (1598). This stress on novelty could also organize an evaluative opposition between "now" and "then": "the women of this Modern age had . . . need of amendment" (1656).

A second complication is that this polemical use makes "modern" the keyword of a struggle over values presented as though it were a claim about historical time. An important precedent in 1C17 French literary circles was the Quarrel of the Ancients and Moderns ("Battle of the Books" in eC18 Britain), when the Renaissance-based doctrine of the superiority of the classics (within which the word "archaic" could be a term of praise) was challenged by a Modern party aspiring, under the growing prestige of modern science, to surpass their achievements. This form of polemic persists in academic "canon wars" today, and "Battle of the Books" still works as a rubric to organize cultural disputes in the media. However, as Raymond Williams (1976: 208) points out, most pre-C19 English uses of "modern," "modernity," and "modernist" were, in comparative contexts, disparaging of the new or, in the case of modernize (first used with reference to buildings, spelling, and dress), apologetic about it: "I have taken the liberty to modernize the language" (1752); "He scruples not to modernize a little" (1753).

The "Western" modern gathers complexity and force with the sense of a variable future that develops in the mC18 as the Christian vision of an inevitable Judgment Day was challenged by the optimistic, secular spirit of the Enlightenment, with its growing awareness of "New Worlds" thriving beyond Europe. For most C18 thinkers, a real or imaginary encounter with "other" peoples was a pretext for criticizing their own societies and imagining ways to reform them in a future now open to change by human action. However, modeled as it was on the custom of comparing the present unfavorably with the past, this more exploratory approach to comparison marks a third complication in the European history of "modern": cultural differences coexisting with each other in time could be evaluated as though some ways of life were more admirable because more archaic, elemental, and pristine than others. The romantic figure of the "noble savage" (1703, Baron de Lanton) emerges in this context. Initially a vision of what human moral life would be like in light of natural religion, "the savage" came to be contrasted favorably with "civilized man" in ways that rebuked the decadence of the latter at the cost of denying to the former a full participation and belongingness in present historical time (Fabian, 1983).

Rendered militant and self-consciously "historic" in the 1C18 by the American and French Revolutions, "modernity" developed an affirmative sense of the times being "other and better than what had gone before" (P. Osborne, 1996: 348). It became a good thing to be modern and then, under the influence of new theories of evolution, a historically necessary thing: in the C19, a doctrine of the inevitability of "progress" was consolidated by the benefits brought to many in the West by the Industrial Revolution and an imperialism armed with a "civilizing mission:" "gunpowder and printing," Thackeray
observed, “tended to modernize the world” (1860). By the time this global view of history became possible, “the modern” was opposed to the traditional, the backward, and the primitive everywhere, rather than compared with the ancient, classical, or medieval in Europe. The idea that some cultures existing in the present really belonged to a past stage of human development was, in a fourth complication, projected spatially on to the map of the world; the progression of time from the past to the future was equated with a movement from a geographic location outside modern Western civilization to another within it. Conversely, “the rest” of the world could be seen as suffering from time-lag: “Nigeria needs to prove that it is stable, modern-minded and representative,” opined the Guardian in 1970.

This geopolitical twist was profoundly consequential, especially as a cultural export of global European and, later, American imperialism. Not only did “the modern” and “Western” become indissociable, with the latter imagined as “central” to a process of world historical development believed to be universal, but people in many parts of the world began to map geopolitical directives on to their pasts and futures, ordering their destinies and desires accordingly. The prescriptive view that to modernize was to Westernize political institutions, social customs, and economic practices formed the basis of modernization theory in mC20 sociology, and in designated “backward” zones within the West, as well as in communist countries and in postcolonial nations established in the “developing world,” poor workers, women, native peoples, “minority” cultures, rural societies, peasant communities, and underclasses were targeted for redemption by the missionary force of the modern (Chakrabarty, 2000; Haebich, 1992).

In a lethal variant of this salvationism, underpinned from the Ic19 by social Darwinist theories of racial selection, remnant people were “doomed” to disappear – a myth made into an agenda by C20 racist movements and state administrations (McGregor, 1997) and into a genocidal program by mC20 Nazism. The terror and complacency of progress had costs for its beneficiaries as well as its victims: if the Holocaust was a product of modern bureaucratic rationality (Bauman, 1989), fascism had and arguably still has a popular cultural appeal as an ostensibly anti-modern movement. As a promise of release not only from the great political and economic disasters of modern times but from both the relentless pace of change and the mundanity of modern everyday life, fascism shares a reactionary cultural impulse with nativist movements around the world that idealize whatever “traditions” they can cast as not-modern or non-Western – thereby reaffirming the latter’s primacy (Sakai, 1997).

Nativist movements have joined both fascism and communism in condemning artistic modernism as “foreign,” “decadent,” “bourgeois,” “elitist,” or a combination of these. Narrowly referring to the experimental literature and art produced between the 1880s and 1940s – with phases of intensity in eC20 Europe, Russia, and East Asia and mC20 USA that attracted people from around the world to the modernist “capital cities” of Paris, Berlin, Shanghai, and New York – modernism is widely understood as a commitment to
discarding tradition and criticizing all conventions of representation. Yet even within **affirmative modernism**, a sense of loss and dissipation afflicts the modern from its inception: in Baudelaire’s famous essay on “The painter of modern life” (1845), the best-known passages dwell on “the ephemeral, the fugitive, the contingent” and dream of an art to distill “the eternal from the transitory” (see P. Osborne, 1996). Arguably, the arts that most closely fulfilled this dream turned out to be those creations of **modern technology**, photography, and cinema – fully modern arts despised by many **modernist critics** for their mass-cultural accessibility and their links to the folk-based popular traditions of magic, the fair, vaudeville, and sensationalist narrative. Yet those links gave cinema in particular a critical force. One of the most enduring images from the late years of **high modernism** is that of the resilient “little man” caught up in the machinery of mass production – played by Charlie Chaplin in *Modern Times* (1936).

Simple, pejorative uses of “modern” to imply deterioration have never lost their force. Complaints about the bad effects of modernity on females, for example, have proved durable, along with praise for the “old-fashioned girl” – “you...are not a modern woman; have neither wings to your shoulders, nor gad-fly in your cap; you love home” (1753). The **modern woman** has recurringly created scandal as a sign of social change: the 1C19 suffragette, the eC20 flapper, the mC20 career girl wearing her New Look, and the 1C20 liberated woman all aroused anxiety about the future in those predominantly white, Western, middle-class environments in which they first appeared. Another complication with “modern,” then, is its capacity to represent what may well be slow, long-term processes of transformation as a series of sudden, sharp shocks – each one novel, yet repetitive of something that has happened before. Rendered banal as **modern fashion** in consumer culture, the modern’s significance deflates until it becomes, as Raymond Williams (1976: 208) notes, “equivalent to IMPROVED,” and thence a topic of irony: “Peace and Quiet poured down the sink, In exchange for a houseful of ‘modern conveniences’” (1937, Edna St Vincent Millay).

By the 1C20, “modern” had largely lost its connotations of future shock and historical rupture, becoming in general usage a period term for an established stylistic tradition with its origins in the past (**modern architecture**, **modern dance**, **modern jazz**). However, “modernity” became a fertile ground for innovation in cultural history and theory (W. Benjamin, 1973; Berman, 1982; Kern, 1983), not least because **modern disciplines** such as anthropology and history were shaped by modernity’s imperial adventurism and ideologies of time (Thomas, 1989). The problem of defining the modern was revived by debates about **postmodernism**, and criticism of “Western” historical narratives centered on white male protagonists paved the way for alternative accounts of **modern experience** as lived on the margins of those narratives by women (Felski, 1995) and enslaved and colonized people (Gilroy, 1993a; C. Hall, 2002), and in cities and cultural centers beyond the West (Baykam, 1994; Harootunian, 2002; Lee, 1999) where arguably the “shock” of **capitalist modernity** was and is at its most intense. In the eC21, perhaps the most fruitful
experiments in thinking about modernity are emerging in parts of the world where “the modern” retains its ambivalence – and thus something of its promise.

Meaghan Morris and Naoki Sakai

See: BUREAUCRACY, DEVELOPMENT, EVERYDAY, EVOLUTION, HOLOCAUST, WEST.

Movements

Like many terms that acquire a special political meaning, movement has diverse general meanings: a part of a symphony, a switch, a change over space and time. This last sense, combined with the idea of strategy or intentionality, now means the coalescing of minority or dominated groups. Two world wars had reshaped political borders, democracy was on the rise, but still minority groups in countries in North America and Britain struggled to achieve the same rights and standard of living as the dominant social groups. “Movement” began to refer specifically to groups of people coming together to seek political, economic, cultural, but especially social change (Smelser, 1962). The US civil rights, Black Power, anti-war, student, women’s, ecology, and gay movements prompted a new label: social movements. At the same time, colonized people, especially on the African continent, pursued dramatic political change as people’s revolutionary movements (Andrews, 1983). Global media enabled both groups to learn of each other’s activities and successes; postcolonial groups and minorities within large democracies soon identified with each other and envisioned a world-wide “movement” for the “liberation” of all subjected peoples.

The new “movements” differed from older campaigns aimed at expressing political dissent, using forms of speech that were daring and mediagenic, from profanity and selective violence to bra-burning and adoption of flamboyant forms of attire. The new social movements (Touraine, 1985) frequently rejected or offered revision to the political theories that predominated, especially liberalism, Cold War diplomacy, and rigid gender roles. Unlike older campaigns – for example, the quest for women’s suffrage, which agreed with democratic ideals and wanted them extended equally to women – the new social movements had more generalized demands: for visibility, to do their own thing, to be freed from the constraints of gender tyranny, to be self-determining in every way. The target of the new social movements was as much prevailing mainstream attitudes as it was swaying the electorate or changing state administrative practices. Indeed, many observers and citizens did not accept the new social movements as appropriately political, either because their demands had more to do with seemingly “private” cultural and social issues (sexuality, ethnic styles, feelings of exclusion) or because their modes of address were seen as hostile, intentionally uncommunicative, and self-righteously vague.

It was unclear who movements represented and how such representation worked, and this was both a strength and weakness of the movements (Snow et al., 1986). Claiming to speak on behalf of those who could not speak for themselves, either because they were