have begun to use the vocabulary of “multiple stakeholders” of country where different
users may have contradictory practices in the country; such contradictions might, for
instance, allow indigenous people the exclusive right to hunt certain native animals.

Legal struggles over country are accompanied by adjacent cultural representations
(W. J. T. Mitchell, 1994a), which are a secondary source of its value (its primary one
being the source of raw materials). This secondary valuing is nevertheless the source of all
knowledge about country, including its cartography and guidelines for its treatment. This
knowledge is objectified as cultural representations of country, which can often be called
landscapes. Such representations can appear in any medium: framed as a landscape
painting or photograph; conceived of as a suitable site for building (as in landscape
architecture); or captured as a moving image in the cinema. The aesthetics of such
landscapes are politics carried out by other means, for what one learns to value in
landscape enables one to “culture” forms of life in any site where a “good” way to live
is being sought. In the comfort of our homes a “picture window” thus domesticates the
“landscaped” country outside, or in a hotel a clichéd painting on the wall reminds us of the
aesthetic function supposedly intensifying our relationships to country, creating feelings of
homeliness or, indeed, of alienation.

Stephen Muecke

See: CITY, HOME, NATION.

Culture

There is now a good deal of hesitancy over the value of the word culture. “I don’t know
how many times,” Raymond Williams once said, “I’ve wished that I’d never heard the
damned word” (R. Williams, 1979: 154), registering his frustration that its complexity
defied the tasks of ordinary analysis. Adam Kuper (1999) is of much the same mind. The
term is now so overused, he argues, that it is better to break it down into its component parts
and speak of beliefs, ideas, art, and traditions rather than expect to find a set of shared
characteristics which brings these together as part of a wider field of culture. Yet the
consensus of opinion probably lies with James Clifford when he says that culture is “a
deeply compromised idea,” but one he “cannot yet do without” (Clifford, 1988: 10).

For at the same time as difficulties have been expressed regarding the value of the
vocabulary of culture, the range of contexts in which that vocabulary now figures has
multiplied extraordinarily in recent years. Earlier qualified uses of the term – such as
high culture, folk culture, mass culture, and popular culture – remain, albeit that the
judgments these implied in the context of class divisions have been weakened. References to
national cultures and to regional cultures, whether at the subnational or supranational
levels, remain, but with the added complication that the boundary lines between what is
to count as national and what as regional have become increasingly contested. However,
there is also now an extended range of uses relating to forms of difference that operate both within nations and across the relations between them. Gay culture, lesbian culture, black culture, ethnic cultures, diasporic cultures, and transnational cultures are all cases in point. The strong association that has been established between the concept of culture and the notion of lifestyles has generated another range of extensions – from subcultures and counter-cultures to club cultures, street cultures, and drug cultures. Body culture, consumer culture, prosthetic culture, material culture, sports culture, media culture, and visual culture similarly point to a proliferation of usage, while culture shock indicates a distinctively modern condition arising from an overexposure to cultural stimulation.

Use of the adjectival cultural has, if anything, grown more rapidly. We now live, we are told, in a cultural economy; cultural policies are an increasingly important field of government activity, with cultural diversity, cultural pluralism, and cultural access and participation important policy objectives. Inner cities are constantly being revived through cultural development, cultural regeneration, or cultural animation programs. Cultural rights are now a significant aspect of contemporary citizenship entitlements, while cultural heritage, cultural property, and the cultural landscape are to be preserved and protected. Cultural imperialism, cultural genocide, cultural tourism, cultural materialism, and cultural capital all indicate an extended use of the adjectival form in more specialist and academic languages. And whole fields of knowledge are now described as cultural. If cultural studies and cultural critique led the way here, the fields of cultural psychology, cultural history, cultural geography, and cultural evolution have followed in short order as a part of the more general cultural turn in the humanities and social sciences.

The unqualified use of culture as a normative standard – still best evoked by Matthew Arnold’s description as “the acquainting ourselves with the best that has been known and said in the world” (1876) – has, however, become rarer. Its champions, moreover, now typically write in an embattled and militant tone. Harold Bloom’s (1995) defense of “great literature” as an improving force in the context of the US culture wars is perhaps the most striking example. By and large, however, the belief that a particular canon of literary, music, or artistic works can claim a monopoly of cultural value is no longer widely supported. This partly reflects the increased role of democratic and egalitarian sentiment, which has made it harder for intellectual elites to claim any special value for their preferred cultural activities over those of other social groups. The resentment such claims occasioned is evident in the long tradition of satirizing elite claims to cultural superiority that we see in such terms as culture vulture, culture hound, and culchah (or kulcha in Australia).

Equally, the waning use of culture as a normative standard reflects the unraveling of the associations which had earlier sustained the meaning of culture as, in Williams’s summary, “a general process of intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic development” and – as the most evident fruits of this process – “the works and practices of intellectual and especially artistic activity” (R. Williams, 1976: 80). With its most immediate roots in L cultura,
referring to the processes of cultivation, caring, or tending, culture implied growth and improvement. This was evident in early horticultural usage where it could refer to both the process of tending for plants and animals ("Such a... plot of his Eden... gratefully crowns his Culture... with chaplets of Flowers" [Boyle, 1665–9]) and the result of such husbandry ("The erth... by... dylygent labour... ys brought to maruelous culture and fertylite" [Starkey, 1538]). The same is true of later scientific usage to refer to the artificial development of microscopic organisms and the growth of plant and animal cells and tissues, where culture can refer to a particular method of growth – that of tissue culture, for example – or the chemical substance in which growth is effected, as in culture medium or culture fluid. This usage was also later extended to the practices through which individuals might seek to develop or improve themselves. This might refer to physical development through the training of the body, as in Hobbes's observation that among the Lacedaemonians, “especially in the culture of their bodies, the nobility observed the most equality with the commons” (1628). Or it might refer to the cultivation of intellectual or spiritual attributes. “The education of Children,” Hobbes claimed, comprised “a Culture of their minds” (1991 [1651]).

It is, however, with the transfer of this set of meanings from the nourishment and growth of individuals to that of society that the most decisive change underlying modern usage occurs. In this history, beginning in the LC18 and EC19 and progressing through to the MC20, culture comes to stand for a general process of social improvement. Functioning, initially, as a term more or less interchangeable with civilization in this regard, its LC19 and EC20 development is conditioned by the emergence of an increasing tension between these two terms. Worked through first in German Romanticism, this history was produced and sustained by a set of antagonisms between, on the one hand, civilization as a standard of material progress best indexed by the development of industrial production and, on the other, culture as the embodiment of a set of higher standards in whose name material civilization might be indicted for its shallowness, coarseness, or incompleteness, when viewed from the higher standards of human wholeness or perfection that the notion of culture increasingly came to represent.

This set of oppositions has proved a productive one. It has sustained a distinctive form of social commentary developed, first, in the German as Kulturkritik, and continuing into the present as cultural criticism or cultural critique, in which works of culture serve as the occasion for the identification of the failings and shortcomings of society. The mixing and mingling of the concepts of culture and aesthetics were important in this regard, especially in the role that aesthetics played in locating in the work of art those higher standards of perfection that the emerging concept of culture proposed as an alternative to the standards of industrial civilization. Friedrich Schiller's Letters on the aesthetic education of man (1967 [1795]) proved especially important here. Schiller defined the encounter between the person and the work of art as one in which the former was confronted with their imperfections and inadequacies when judged from the higher standards of the art work.
This meant that the experience of art could be transformed into one of self-improvement, as the person would aim to close the gap between their rough empirical self and the poise and harmony represented by the work of art.

If culture thus supplied a set of standards through which industrial civilization might be called to account before a higher court of appeal, it also supplied a means of overcoming the shortcomings that such a court might pronounce. The material and institutional history of culture is important here. Culture, in this specializing and improving sense, existed not just as a set of ideas: in the mC19 development of public libraries, museums, concert halls, and art galleries, it also informed the practices of a new set of cultural institutions which aimed to combat the shortcomings of civilization by diffusing the higher standards of culture throughout society. While these shortcomings included the values of industrialism, they also, and more particularly, included the ways of life of the urban working classes and the need to enfold these classes within the improving force of culture if the threat of anarchy were to be averted.

The whole material layout of the C19 city was radically affected by this conception of culture and its mobilization as a moral force through which individuals might be enabled to improve themselves to achieve the kinds of poise, balance, and self-perfection that Schiller spoke of. Arnold captured this sense when he wrote that “culture indefatigably tries not to make what each raw person may like, the rule by which he fashions himself; but to draw ever nearer to a sense of what is indeed beautiful, graceful, and becoming, and to get the raw person to like that” (Arnold, 1971 [1869]: 39). The C18 had been a “display city” (P. Joyce, 2003: 151) where, in promenades and assembly rooms, the well-to-do exhibited their civility and enlightenment without any regard to either their own moral interiors or those of the subordinate classes. In the C19, the transference of the religiously inspired associations of Gothic architecture to libraries, museums, and galleries incorporated a moral address into the built forms of the urban environment, as they beckoned the urban population with the prospect of spiritual and cultural uplift and improvement.

Such conceptions continued to be influential in the C20, informing the development of public broadcast systems and with an ongoing, albeit diminished, impact on cultural policies. The period from the mC19 to the eC21 has, however, witnessed serious challenges to the singular normative view of culture which underlies the culture–civilization opposition. This reflects the challenges that have come from the varied social movements – old and new – which have refused to accept the negative evaluation of their own cultural pursuits that the Arnoldian usage entailed. The socialist and labor movements, feminism, the struggles of indigenous peoples and of minority ethnic cultures, and the identification of the African-American contributions to the cultures of modernism have all taken issue with the classed, gendered, racial, and Eurocentric biases that undermined the universalism of culture’s claim to be the best that has been known and said. The increased commodification of all forms of cultural production and cultural consumption has also blurred any sense of a single division between “real culture” and “the rest.” In what are now highly
segmented cultural markets with their own internal distinctions of value, high culture looks more and more like one cultural market among others.

The use and interpretation of culture within academic debates have both been affected by and contributed to these developments. Williams’s own writing on culture has proved important here. By showing how the supposedly universal standards of perfection associated with the normative view of culture turned out, in practice, to have strong connections with the particular values of ruling groups and classes, he extended our sense of what might count as culture. This made it possible for the symbolic aspects of everyday life to be included as well as the products of high culture—and, just as important, to be included on the same terms without any sense of an essential and embattled distinction between “real culture” and “the rest.”

As a result of these developments, the view of culture as a standard of perfection has tended to give way to the third of Williams’s senses of culture, referring to the “particular way of life, whether of a people, a period or a group” (R. Williams, 1976: 80). Edward Tylor, a key figure in the development of 19th social anthropology, has often been credited with the responsibility for this view of culture. Williams sees him as a link between Johann Gottfried von Herder’s 18th critique of the Eurocentric values implicit in “universal” histories of culture and civilization, and 20th forms of cultural relativism. The key text here is the passage where Tylor says that culture “is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society” (Tylor, 1874: 1). However, the seeming even-handedness that is implied here is, as George Stocking Jr (1968) notes, belied as Tylor proceeds to arrange different cultures into evolutionary stages, in which each stage represents progress from one state of culture development between the twin extremes of “savage and cultured life” (Tylor, 1874: 26).

Yet it is still with good reason that the view of culture as a way of life is referred to as the ethnographic or anthropological definition of culture. For it owes its most influential contemporary formulation to the work of Franz Boas. Trained in German anthropology in the 19th, Boas translated the non-evolutionary assumptions of German anthropology into the first fully developed statement of the principles of cultural relativism during his later work in America. As different cultures set their own standards of value, Boas argued, only serious misunderstanding and social harm can result from attempts to arrange cultures into evaluative hierarchies or evolutionary sequences. As the first social scientist to speak of cultures in the plural (Menand, 2002: 384), Boas’s work contributed to the broader criticisms of American society as a melting pot in which differences were to be extinguished that was evident in the writings of pragmatists like John Dewey. Boas’s sense of the social and relational nature of cultures, defined in terms of their differences from one another, was also evident in William Du Bois’s use of the term “double-consciousness” to describe the identities of African-Americans, caught in the relations between white and black cultures.
Culture

It is this sense of culture as a set of flows and relations that lies behind some of the misgivings that Arjun Appadurai (1996) expresses regarding the continuing value of the ethnographic concept of culture as a “way of life.” For this has often led to a tendency to taxonomize cultures by providing a means of dividing societies into separate groups identified in terms of their distinctive beliefs and behaviors. As such, its history has been closely bound up with the development of modern forms of administration. Theodor Adorno was perhaps the first to notice this when he noted that “the single word ‘culture’ betrays from the outset the administrative view, the task of which, looking down from on high, is to assemble, distribute, evaluate and organise” (Adorno, 1991: 93). It is, however, the uses to which culture has been put in association with the development of colonial forms of administration that have most exercised more recent criticisms of this administrative logic. Used as a way of dividing colonized populations into separate groups identified in terms of their ways of life, the ethnographic concept of culture was integral to the development of colonial systems of rule which aimed to segregate populations along racial and ethnic lines (Dirks, 2001).

There is accordingly, in current usage, a move away from the view that cultures can be described as fixed and separate entities. The terms cultural hybridity, cultural flows, transculturation, cross-cultural dialogue, and cultural in-betweenness thus all draw attention to the fluidity and impermanence of cultural distinctions and relationships. The change of emphasis that is involved here is best captured by the shift from speaking of different cultures to a stress on cultures in difference, with the implication that cultural activities are caught up in processes of differing rather than being simply different from the outset. The emphasis on processes of racializing or ethnicizing culture points in the same direction.

Distinctions between nature and culture now also have a weaker force as a result of the increasing sense that the relations between these are best thought of as porous and permeable. Developments in human genetics, biology, biotechnology, genetic medicine, and biotechnology have been especially important here, leading to a series of technological interventions into the human body and nature — from in vitro fertilization to genetically modified (GM) crops — which have called into question their separation from cultural processes. The new vocabulary of cyberculture, nanoculture, somatic culture, and technoculture reflect these concerns, which are equally central to contemporary popular culture — the Terminator movies, for example.

It is a moot point, however, whether, in spite of all these changes, current ways of thinking about and engaging with culture have entirely escaped the pull of the eC19 to mC20 construction of the relations between culture and civilization. However, this now increasingly appears to be best thought of as a historically specific set of mechanisms for sorting populations into groups and managing the relations between them. There was, William Ray (2001) argues, a clear logic of culture at work here in the sense that culture, by posing itself as a challenge to, and opportunity for, individual self-improvement seemed
to offer a means for individuals to sort themselves into different groups. Culture thus offered an important means for regulating societies by suggesting that their key divisions resulted from the ways in which individuals seemed naturally to differentiate themselves according to how far they did (the respectable middle classes) and did not (the feckless poor) respond to the cultural imperative of self-improvement. This mechanism did not operate in colonial contexts, where the logic of culture as a "way of life" was annexed to the more coercive forms of management associated with "the ethnographic state" (Dirks, 2001). Nor, in other contact histories, has it proved to be easily transportable. The mixture of incomprehension and opposition that resulting from attempts to mobilize (as newly invented terms) art (bijitsu) and culture (bunka) in the programs of civilization and enlightenment (bunmei kaika) characterizing the Meiji period in Japan (Figal, 1999) testify to just how far this logic of culture has been bound and limited to the West. The spread, more generally, however, of differentiated cultural markets and lifestyles, each with its own distinctive styles of consumption and ways of fashioning behavior, has proved a more adaptable way of reshaping social distinctions by virtue of the groups into which individuals seem naturally to sort themselves through the cultural activities they pursue.

*Tony Bennett*

See: AESTHETICS, ART, CANON, CIVILIZATION, COLONIALISM, ETHNICITY, RACE.