

flow for a test of the plausibility, story grammars well-formedness – and entire narrative text.

Story grammar models (Stein and Glenn 1977; Stein and Glenn 1982). The order unit of a story is an even category: setting, response, goal, attempt, plan. Each category can be defined in terms of the setting introduces the protagonist and contains information about the physical, social, or temporal context of the story. (See SPACE IN NARRATIVE: *initiating event* marks some information about the protagonist's environment. The function is to evoke an action in the protagonist. The goal is to achieve a goal; desire to achieve a goal motivates the protagonist to act. The attempt results in a reaction. The final type of reaction. Three types of reactions: (1) the protagonist responds to a goal; (2) future consequences of an action; (3) failure; (4) attainment or failure; (5) pursuing a goal.

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story information (Stein and Trabasso 1982). When a presented story text does not match the expected sequence of events, the ability to accurately represent the text decreases significantly. The time necessary to process and encode the text increases, as does confabulation, or the invention of information never presented in the text (Stein and Trabasso 1982). Thus, if incoming story information contains several violations of expectation, in terms of readers' knowledge about well-structured stories, the story may need to be repeated several times before an accurate representation is retained.

A story schema also contains information about ideal types of causal structure that should link the components of a story (see CAUSALITY). Trabasso *et al.*, (1984) have demonstrated that both narrative understanding and memory of narrated events are directly proportional to the number of causally active clauses used in the text. In other words, a causal chain can be formed from the beginning to the end of a well-structured story. The number of story clauses that lie on the causal chain predicts memory for the story. Additionally, the number of causal connections a given clause has to other clauses predicts whether that clause will be remembered.

Story schemata can be acquired in two ways: by listening to or reading stories, and by understanding intentional action that gets carried out in everyday social interaction (see INTENTIONALITY). Acquisition starts almost as soon as children begin to understand and use language (Stein and Albro 1997). Much of story knowledge is organised around the desire to achieve and promote personally significant goals, the obstacles that preclude goal attainment, and plans that overcome obstacles to goal attainment. Thus, goals are central organising components of the story schema. By the age of three, children have acquired a rich repertoire of knowledge about different types of stories. They use this knowledge to recount their memories and evaluations of events, emotions, desires, actions, and outcomes, especially those pertaining to the maintenance of personally meaningful goals. Both children and adults use their knowledge of stories to create fantasies, participate in arguments, and plan for future interaction (Stein and Albro 2001). They are then able to build a deeper understanding of more complicated stories as their knowledge of obstacles and plans for overcoming obstacles increases.

SEE ALSO: children's storytelling; discourse analysis (linguistics); psychological approaches to narrative

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STORYWORLD

In research on natural language processing, the terms *mental model* (Johnson-Laird 1983) and *discourse model* (Webber 1979) are used to refer to non-linguistic representations of the situation(s) described by a sentence or set of sentences, i.e., a discourse (Stevenson 1996; see SITUATION MODEL). Models of this sort are global mental representations enabling language users to draw inferences about items and occurrences either explicitly mentioned or else implicitly evoked in a discourse. Storyworlds, in turn, can be defined as the class of discourse models used for understanding narratively organised discourse in particular. In this sense, narrative comprehension requires

reconstructing storyworlds on the basis of textual cues and the inferences that they make possible (Herman 2002).

Storyworlds are thus mental models of who did what to and with whom, when, where, why, and in what fashion in the world to which interpreters relocate (Ryan 1991) as they work to comprehend a narrative. Like Jahn's (1997) cognitive frames and Emmott's contextual frames (1997), storyworlds function in both a top-down and a bottom-up way during narrative comprehension. Top-down, they provide the presuppositions guiding readers to assume that fast food restaurants and electron microscopes are not components of the world of Proust's *Recherche*. But, bottom-up, a given story-world is also subject to being updated, revised, or even abandoned in favour of another with the accretion of textual cues, as when the reader of a text featuring an unreliable homodiegetic narrator gradually realises that the storyworld is not at all the way its teller says it is (see RELIABILITY).

More generally, when compared with cognate narratological terms such as *fabula* or *story*, *storyworld* better captures what might be called the ecology of narrative interpretation. In trying to make sense of a narrative, interpreters attempt to reconstruct not just what happened but also the surrounding context or environment embedding storyworld *existents, their attributes, and the *actions and *events in which they are involved. Indeed, the grounding of stories in storyworlds goes a long way towards explaining narratives' immersiveness, their ability to 'transport' interpreters into places and times that they must occupy for the purposes of narrative comprehension. Interpreters do not merely reconstruct a sequence of events and a set of existents, but imaginatively (emotionally, viscerally) inhabit a world in which things matter, agitate, excite, repulse, provide grounds for laughter and grief, and so on – both for narrative participants and for interpreters of the story. More than reconstructed timelines and inventories of existents, then, storyworlds are mentally and emotionally projected environments in which interpreters are called upon to live out complex blends of cognitive and imaginative response.

SEE ALSO: cognitive narratology; deixis; discourse analysis (linguistics); emotion and

narrative; immersion; narrative comprehension; story-discourse distinction

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STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND INTERIOR MONOLOGUE

The two terms 'stream of consciousness' and 'interior monologue' have different origins but have now become inextricably linked. 'Stream of consciousness' was first used by the psychologist William James (brother of the novelist Henry James) in *Principles of Psychology* (1890). It is thought that 'interior monologue' was probably first used to describe James Joyce's *Ulysses* (1922).

Although the formal or theoretical definitions for these terms vary widely, the ostensive or practical definitions are very precise. Apart from occasional references to earlier novelists (for example, Edouard Dujardin), theorists define the phrases in relation to the *modernist novels of Joyce, Virginia Woolf, William Faulkner, and Dorothy Richardson. The examples used to illustrate the terms are invariably taken from *Ulysses* or, less often, from Woolf's *The Lighthouse* (1927) or Mrs. Dalloway (1925).

Some of the theoretical definitions describe the types of fictional thought that occur in the minds of *characters in the story or *fabula* (see

STORY-DISOURSE DISTINCTION
CONSCIOUSNESS REPRESENTATION
Although most emphases are on the illogical, and seemingly unconnected, thought, others mention directed thought; non-conscious thought; verbal, but also non-verbal thought; specifically cognitive only, which combinations of cognition and *emotions.

Confusingly though, others refer to a completely different set of thought and consciousness or *sjuzhet*. More apparently unmediated pre-free direct thought. However, many illustrative passages are mixed, often in equal parts of description of the physical three modes of thought report, free indirect thought. For example:

Made him feel a bit pensive. The coals were red-hot. Another slice of tinned beef. Four: right (free direct thought). Her plate full (free indirect

There is no clear consensus between the two terms in general. I use the terms interchangeably to refer to a particular type or subset of different and separate mental consciousness and separate mental consciousness describes the presentation of thought in a passage which is illustrative of the characteristic of Woolf's *Ulysses*: Interior monologue is the 'autonomous monologue', continuous, first-person perspective that contain uninterrupted thought such as 'Penelope's monologue in the last episode of three sections of Faulkner's (1929). For example:

I suppose she was pious
look at her twice I hope
wonder she didn't want